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FOURTH AMENDMENT-USING THE
DRUG COURIER PROFILE TO FIGHT
THE WAR ON DRUGS
United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Sokolow,I the United States Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment 2 does not preclude the use of
" 'probabilistic' facts describing 'personal characteristics' of drug
couriers" 3 as a basis for a finding of "reasonable suspicion" neces-
sary to justify a brief investigative detention of a suspected drug
courier.4 This Note explores the Sokolow opinions and concludes
that the Court correctly held that "reasonable suspicion" did, in
fact, exist in this case. This Note recognizes, however, that the
Court's rationale is fraught with potentially harmful consequences.
This Note reasons that the Court's failure to clearly define the fac-
tors necessary to support a finding of "reasonable suspicion" not
only leaves other courts with little guidance in future cases, but
might also give these Courts seemingly unbridled discretion to in-
trude on citizens' fourth amendment rights through the affirmation
of suspect "reasonable suspicion" determinations. This Note also
concludes that the Sokolow Court misread Florida v. Royer 5 in an ef-
fort to expand the permissible boundaries of a brief, investigative
Terry stop.6 Finally, this Note concludes that the Court improperly
discounted the significance of the use of "drug-courier profiles" and
the potential hazards that these profiles can create.
II. HISTORY OF REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
The fourth amendment 7 requires that a seizure of a person by a
1 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
2 For the text of the fourth amendment, see infra note 77.
3 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585-87 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413,
1420 (9th Cir. 1987)).
4 Id. at 1585-86.
5 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
6 The "Tery stop" terminology originated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). For
the rationale supporting a Terry stop, see infra notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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law enforcement agent requires probable cause. 8 In Terry v. Ohio,9
however, the United States Supreme Court developed an exception
to the probable cause standard. The Terry majority held that certain
seizures arejustifiable under the fourth amendment if there is a rea-
sonable suspicion that a person has or is about to commit a crime.' 0
Since a permissible seizure based on merely reasonable suspicion,
rather than probable cause, involves an additional intrusion into an
individual's personal security, the "scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to andjustified by' the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible.""II In addition, the seizure must be justified
by a legitimate governmental interest. 12 In Terry, the Court found
that a legitimate governmental interest existed due to the presence
of reasonable grounds to believe that Terry was armed and danger-
ous.' 3 Thus, Terry presented an immediate danger to both the of-
ficers and bystanders. The reasonable suspicion exception to the
probable cause standard has since been extended to other situations
in which a strong governmental interest exists, 14 specifically. activi-
ties involving narcotics. 15
The Terry Court held that an officer may make a brief investiga-
tive detention 16 of a suspect when the officer observes suspicious
conduct that leads him or her reasonably to conclude, in light of
previous experiences, that criminal activity "may be afoot."' 17 Since
Terry, three important principles regarding the application of the
"reasonable suspicion" standard have developed. First, an officer
may not act on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch.' "18 Instead, "some minimum level of objective justification
[must be present] to validate the detention or seizure."' 19 Second, in
evaluating whether a particular set of factors is sufficient to support
a finding of reasonable suspicion, "the totality of the circum-
stances-the whole picture-must be taken into account."' 20 Finally,
8 Id. For the text of the fourth amendment, see infra note 77.
9 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10 Id. at 30.
'1 Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (For-
tas, J., concurring)).
12 Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
13 Id. at 30.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (purpose of investi-
gation to verify or dispel suspicion that immigration laws were being violated).
15 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 493 (1983).
16 This brief investigative detention has become commonly referred to as a "Terry
stop."
17 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
18 Id. at 27.
19 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
20 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
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the evidence known to an officer at the time of the seizure must be
evaluated "fact on fact and clue on clue"; the officer should consider
the possible "inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person."2 1
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On Sunday, July 22, 1984, Andrew Sokolow purchased from the
United Airlines ticket counter at Honolulu Airport two round-trip
airline tickets for a flight departing for Miami later that day.22
Sokolow paid $2100 for the tickets from a roll of twenty dollar bills
believed to contain approximately $4000.23 The tickets had open
return dates and were purchased in the names of "Andrew Kray"
and 'Janet Norian." 24 Sokolow gave the agent his home telephone
number. 25 Sokolow was dressed in a black jumpsuit and gold jew-
elry. 26 He was about twenty-five years old and was accompanied by
a woman who was, indeed, Janet Norian.2 7 The ticket agent ob-
served that Sokolow was acting nervously. 28 Neither Sokolow nor
Norian checked any luggage. 29
After Sokolow and Norian departed, the ticket agent notified
Honolulu Police Department Officer John McCarthy of Sokolow's
suspicious purchase.30 McCarthy discovered that the telephone
number Sokolow gave to the ticket agent was currently issued to a
"Karl Herman." 31 Herman was Sokolow's roommate, although Mc-
Carthy was not aware of this fact at that time.32 McCarthy could not
locate a telephone listing for an "Andrew Kray" anywhere in the
state of Hawaii. 33 Officer McCarthy then learned that return reser-
vations from Miami to Honolulu in the names of Kray and Norian
had been made for July 25, just three days after the couple had
left. 34 The return flight was scheduled to stop in both Denver and
21 Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) (No.
87-1295) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1981)).
















On July 25, Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) identified Sokolow at Los Angeles Airport. 36 The DEA
agents observed that Sokolow "appeared to be very nervous and
was looking all around the waiting area." 37 At 6:30 p.m. Sokolow
arrived in Honolulu, still accompanied by Norian.38 Sokolow was
wearing the same black outfit and gold jewelry, and the couple still
had not checked any of their baggage. 39 The couple exited the air-
port, proceeded directly towards the street, and attempted to hail a
cab.40 At that point they were approached by Agent Richard Kemp-
shall and three other DEA agents. 4 1 Agent Kempshall showed his
credentials, grabbed Sokolow's arm, and moved him back onto the
sidewalk where Kempshall requested Sokolow's airline ticket and
identification. 42 Sokolow denied having either document with
him.43 Sokolow admitted that his name was, in fact, "Sokolow," but
explained that he was traveling under his mother's maiden name of
"Kray." 44
The DEA agents escorted Sokolow and Norian to the DEA of-
fice located at the airport.45 In that office, the couple's luggage was
subjected to a "sniff search" examination by a narcotics detection
dog known as "Donker. ' 46 Donker alerted the agents to Sokolow's
brown shoulder bag.4 7 The agents then arrested Sokolow and in-
formed him of his constitutional rights.48 Sokolow decided not to
make any statement at that time.49 DEA agents secured a warrant to
search Sokolow's brown shoulder bag.50 Upon searching the bag,
the agents found no illicit drugs, but did locate several suspicious
items suggesting Sokolow's participation in drug trafficking. 5'
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Joint Appendix at 43-44, Sokolow (No. 87-1295).













51 Id. These items included the following: two different used airline tickets in the
names of Andrew Kray andJames Wodehouse from Honolulu to Miami and back; Miami
hotel receipts with dates corresponding to those on the used airline tickets; handwritten
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Agents had Donker examine Sokolow's remaining bags once
again.52 Upon reexamination, Donker focused on a medium-sized
Louis Vuitton bag.53 Since it was 9:30 p.m. and too late to obtain
another search warrant, the agents retained Sokolow's luggage, but
allowed him to leave for the night.5 4 The following morning Soko-
low's luggage was reexamined by a different dog who confirmed
Donker's findings.55 The agents obtained a search warrant and
upon examination found 1,063 grams of cocaine inside Sokolow's
bag.56
IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Andrew Sokolow was indicted for possession with the intent to
distribute cocaine.57 Sokolow moved "to suppress the cocaine and
other evidence seized from his luggage."58 The United States Dis-
trict Court for Hawaii denied Sokolow's motion, finding that reason-
able suspicion that he was involved in drug trafficking existed when
DEA agents stopped him at Honolulu Airport. 59 Sokolow then en-
tered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges contained in the
indictment. 60
By a divided vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed Sokolow's conviction and suppressed the ille-
gally-seized evidence. 6 1 The majority, applying a new two-part test,
held that the DEA agents did not possess reasonable suspicion nec-
essary to justify the stop.6 2 The majority's test divided the factors
potentially capable of raising reasonable suspicion into two catego-
ries. 63 The first category consisted of factors describing "ongoing
notes indicating amounts of money owed to Sokolow from various individuals; and a
personal address book which contained the names and telephone numbers of individu-
als who were suspected of involvement in drug trafficking. Magistrate's Report at 2,
Sokolow (No. 87-1295).





57 Id. The relevant federal statute provides in pertinent part: "(a) Except as author-
ized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ... 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
58 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987).
62 Id. at 1424.
63 Id. at 1423.
In an earlier decision the Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court, but on
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criminal activity." 64 The court determined that one factor from this
first category was always needed to support a finding of reasonable
suspicion.65 The majority's second category consisted of "personal
characteristics" of drug couriers. 66 The majority reasoned that
these second category "personal characteristics" were "shared by
drug couriers and the public at large" 67 and could not, standing
alone, support a finding of reasonable suspicion.68 These character-
istics were to be considered only "if there was evidence of criminal
behavior [(category-one factors)] and the government offered
'[e]mpirical documentation' that the combination of facts at issue
did not describe the behavior of 'significant numbers of innocent
persons.' "69
The majority applied its new test and determined that the
agent's stop of Sokolow was impermissible due to the absence of
evidence of ongoing criminal behavior (category-one factors). 70
The dissent criticized the majority's two-part test as "overly mech-
anistic" 7 1 and "contrary to the case-by-case determination of rea-
sonable articulable suspicion based on all the facts." 72
The United States Supreme Court, realizing the serious impli-
cations on the enforcement of federal narcotics laws raised by this
case, granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. 73
V. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In Sokolow, the Court explored the standard of "reasonable sus-
picion" in relation to the requirements necessary to justify a stop
the basis of different reasoning. United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeals' second decision was
issued after the Government petitioned for rehearing on the ground that the court
had erred in considering each of the factors known to the agents separately rather
than in terms of the totality of the circumstances.
Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1584 n.2.
64 Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1422. These factors include the use ot an alias, id., or evasive
movement through an airport, id. at 1423.
65 Id. at 1422.
66 Id. at 1420. These characteristics include cash payments for tickets, a short trip to
a major source city for drugs, nervousness, type of attire, and unchecked luggage.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987)).
70 Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1424.
71 Id. at 1426.
72 Id. (emphasis in original).
73 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585.
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and brief detainment of a suspected drug courier. 74 Writing for the
majority, 75 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that police can stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes76 without violating
the fourth amendment 77 even if probable cause does not exist, pro-
vided the officer has a "reasonable suspicion supported by articul-
able facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot.' -78 Recognizing that
"the concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not
'readily or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,' -79 the
majority criticized the Court of Appeals' effort to define such re-
quirements in its two-part test.80
Observing that the fourth amendment demands " 'some mini-
mum level of objective justification' " for making a stop,8' ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist stated that an officer must be capable of articulating
"more than just an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch.' "82 However, ChiefJustice Rehnquist reasoned that a Terry
stop could be justified even with "proof of wrongdoing [amounting
to less than] .. .a preponderance of the evidence."83 Chief'Justice
Rehnquist concluded by stating that in evaluating the validity of a
stop, the court must consider " 'the totality of the circumstances-
the whole picture.' "84
The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's two-part test due to
its division of evidentiary factors into discrete categories and the dif-
74 Id.
75 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
76 This type of stop is often referred to as a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968). For an explanation of this type of stop, see supra notes 7-21 and accompany-
ing text.
77 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
78 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). This
standard was first articulated by the court in Teny.
79 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
80 Id.
81 Id. (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
82 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
83 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist reached this conclusion through a series of analogies
noting that "probable cause means 'a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found.' " Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted further that "the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is
obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." Id. (citing United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 (1985)).
84 Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
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fering probative values assigned to each. 5 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
discounted the weight the lower court assigned to those factors
which were purported to suggest evidence of "ongoing criminal ac-
tivity."8s 6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist then discussed the probative sig-
nificance of the "personal characteristics" of drug couriers which
the lower court relegated to category-two status.8 7 The majority
cited Royer88 to support its conclusion that "by itself any one of
these [category-two] factors is not proof of illegal conduct and.is
quite consistent with innocent travel[, b]ut ... taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion."8 9 The Court, citing Terry90 as an
example, added that "there could, of course, be circumstances in
which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal
conduct was afoot." 9 1
The Court continued by rejecting Sokolow's argument concern-
ing the problems inherent in the use of the DEA's "drug courier
profiles" and its implications on this case.92 The Court downplayed
the importance of these "profiles" and instead concentrated on the
evidence based on the articulable factors upon which the trained
agents were able to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed re-
gardless of whether or not the factors present were, in fact, con-
tained in a "drug courier profile." 93
The majority closed its opinion by discounting Sokolow's claim
that the agents neglected their "obligat[ion] to use the least intru-
sive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions that he was
85 Id. at 1586.
86 Id. The majority hypothesized situations in which this type of behavior would not
reflect ongoing criminal activity, such as 1) a person traveling under an alias who
"wished to travel to a hospital or clinic for an operation and wished to concealed [sic]
that fact," or 2) a person "taking an evasive path through an airport ... to avoid a
confrontation with an angry acquaintance or with a creditor." Id.
87 Id. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
88 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
89 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 502),
90 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
91 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448, U.S. 438 (1980) (per
curiam)).
92 Id. at 1587. Sokolow contends that the characteristics do not create suspicion of
criminal behavior, the validity of the profile has never been established, and the profile
itself has been proven to have no predictive value in the investigation of airport narcot-
ics trafficking. Brief for Respondent at 137, Sokolow (No. 87-1295).
93 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587. The factors believed to be contained in these drug
courier profiles include the following: 1) young age; 2) casual dress; 3) last minute reser-
vations and ticket purchases; 4) brief visits; 5) unusual or circuitous itinerary; 6) de-
planing last; 7) arrival in the early morning hours; 8) concealing a travel companion; 9)
cash purchase of tickets; 10) nervousness; 11) traveling under an alias; 12) visiting a
"source city" for illicit drugs; and 13) use of only carry-on luggage. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioner at 15-25, Sokolow (No. 87-1295); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
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smuggling narcotics." ' 94 Relying on Royer,9 5 Sokolow claimed that
the agents should have only approached and spoken to him to verify
or dispel their suspicion, instead of forcibly detaining him.9 6 The
Court explained that Royer was concerned with the length of the in-
vestigative stop, not whether or not a less intrusive means of verifi-
cation existed at the time.97 The Court concluded by discussing the
practical problems associated with adopting Sokolow's view98 such
as "hampering the police's ability to make swift on-the-spot deci-
sions" 9 9 and the tendency to require courts to "indulge in 'unrealis-
tic second-guessing.' "100
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent,' 0 ' Justice Marshall objected to the
Court's holding on the grounds that such a ruling diminishes the
rights of both guilty and innocent citizens "to be secure in their per-
sons"'1 2 as they travel through the airports of the United States. 0 3
Noting that reasonable suspicion must be based on "'specific and
articulable facts' "14-suggesting that a suspect is "engaged in, or
[is] poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment " t051-Justice Mar-
shall concluded that "the facts about Andrew Sokolow known to the
DEA agents at the time they stopped him fall short of reasonably
indicating that he was engaged at the time in criminal activity."' 10 6
The dissent expressed great concern over the use of "drug cou-
rier profiles" such as the one relied upon by DEA agents to stop and
94 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587 (citing Brief for Respondent at 12-13, 21-23, Sokolow
(No. 87-1295)).
95 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).
96 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587. In Royer, the Court stated that "the investigative meth-
ods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
97 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
98 Id. In this particular case, Sokolow was about to enter into a taxicab when he was
detained by the DEA agents. Id. Thus, the agents were presumably faced with the pros-
pect of detaining Sokolow or having him leave via taxi from their immediate view and
possibly dispose of any incriminating evidence before he could be re-located.
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 687 (1985))). In retrospect it
seems possible always to imagine a less intrusive way to detain a suspect.
101 Justice Marshall was joined by justice Brennan.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 77.
103 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
105 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The court also cited as exam-
ples Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
106 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1004 [Vol. 80
DRUG COURIER PROFILES
detain Sokolow. t0 7 Believing that the use of such mechanistic crite-
ria can "only dull the officer's ability and determination to make
sensitive and fact-specific inferences 'in light of his exper-
iences,' "108 Justice Marshall expressed his fear that the reliance on
drug courier profiles "runs a far greater risk than does ordinary,
case-by-case police work, of subjecting innocent individuals to un-
warranted police harassment and detention."'1 9 Justice Marshall
explained that his fear is justified by the extensive case history 1 0
which demonstrates the manner in which drug courier profiles can
be manipulated to match almost "any particular set of observa-
tions."' 11 The dissent analogized the instant case to Reid v. Geor-
gia, 112 a case in which the Supreme Court held that a collection of
similar facts was insufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion."13
In that case the Court found that the only observation that the
agents cited as indicative of criminal activity was the fact that Reid
"preceded another person and occasionally looked backward at him
as they proceeded through the concourse." ' 1 4 The Reid Court rea-
soned that such a fact did not, of itself, provide reasonable suspicion
that Reid was engaged in criminal activity at that time." 15 The Court
explained that such evidence only represented an "inchoate and un-
107 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting) (quoting Tery, 392 U.S. at 27).
109 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1588-89 (Marshall,J., dissenting). These cases include the following: compare
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (suspect was first to deplane),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983) with United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564
(1980) (last to deplane) and United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d
Cir. 1980) (deplaned from middle); compare United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th
Cir. ,1980) (one-way tickets) with United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir.
1977) (round-trip tickets); compare United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir.
1977) (non-stop flight) with United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.
1987) (changed planes); compare Craemer, 555 F.2d at 595 (no luggage) with United States
v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981) (gym bag), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982)
and Sullivan, 625 F.2d at 12 (new suitcases); compare United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882,
883 (6th Cir. 1978) (traveling alone) with United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1980) (traveling with companion); compare United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563,
566 (6th Cir. 1979) (acted nervously), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979) with United States
v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (5th Cir. 1977) (acted too calmly), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1977).
111 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112 448 U.S. 438 (1980). The four observations made by agents in that case were the
following: 1) Reid and a companion arrived in Atlanta from Fort Lauderdale, a source
city for cocaine; 2) They had arrived early in the morning, when law enforcement activ-
ity is minimal; 3) Reid and his companions carried only shoulder bags; 4) Reid and his







particularized suspicion or 'hunch.' "116 The Reid Court discounted
the agents' other evidence as non-probative because it "describe[d]
a very large category of presumably innocent travelers."' 17 Noting
that nervousness was the only behavioral characteristic Sokolow ex-
hibited that might suggest "criminal activity," Justice Marshall dis-
counted such evidence as perfectly consistent with innocent
modern-day air travel, rather than one's involvement in criminal ac-
tivity due to the widespread "news accounts . . . of plane crashes,
near-collisions, and air terrorism." 118
After downplaying Sokolow's nervousness, the dissent contin-
ued by attacking the remaining characteristics as "scarcely indicative
of criminal activity."' " 9 The dissent referred to the fact that Soko-
low took a brief trip to Miami with only carry-on luggage as
" 'describ[ing] a very large category of presumably innocent travel-
ers.' "120 The fact that Miami is a "source city for illicit drugs"' 12 1
was not significant in Justice Marshall's view because thousands of
innocent travelers arrive and depart each day from Miami, as well as
from the exhaustive list of cities referred to as "source cities" from
past DEA testimony. 122 The phone number Sokolow gave the ticket
agent, which was not listed in his name, is not suggestive of criminal
activity, the dissent explained, because it is common practice for a
phone to be listed in the name of one roommate and not the
other. 123
The dissent also cautioned against the assertion that the charac-
ter of Sokolow's attire was in some way probative of his involvement
in criminal activity. 124 Justice Marshall criticized the proposition
and explained:
For law enforcement officers to base a search, even in part, on a pop
guess that persons dressed in a particular fashion are likely to commit
crimes not only stretches the concept of reasonable suspicion beyond
recognition, but also is inimical to the self-expression which the choice
116 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
117 Id. For a list of these factors, see supra note 112.
118 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1590 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid, 448 U.S. at 441).
121 Id. at 1583.
122 Id. at 1590 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall suggested that nearly every
major city may be characterized by the Drug Enforcement Administration as a "source
city for illicit drugs." See, e.g., United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 n.5
(2d Cir. 1980).
123 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1590 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This was, in fact, exactly what
happened in this case; Sokolow's number was listed under his roommate's name of
"Karl Herman." Id. at 1584.
124 Id. at 1590 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1006 [Vol. 80
DRUG COURIER PROFILES
of wardrobe may provide 125
While conceding that major cash purchases are less common
today than in the past,' 26 the dissent denied that Sokolow's payment
for his airline tickets in cash was in any way suggestive of "ongoing
criminal activity."' 127 The dissent recognized that a person spending
large amounts of cash may be trying to launder proceeds from ear-
lier criminal acts, but noted that "investigating completed episodes
of crime goes beyond the appropriately limited purview of the brief,
Teny-style seizure. ' 128
Finally, the dissent concluded by denying the appropriateness
of a seizure in this situation.129 The dissent reasoned that since the
agents had ascertained that Sokolow's voice was; in fact, the voice
on the answering machine at the telephone number he gave the
ticket agent, they could have easily determined where Sokolow lived
and could have continued their investigation in a manner less intru-
sive to Sokolow's constitutional rights. 130
VI. ANALYSIS
In Sokolow, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Ninth
Circuit and decided to admit the cocaine seized from Sokolow by
finding that reasonable suspicion did, in fact, exist at the time he
was stopped by drug enforcement agents.' 3 ' While the Court was
correct in overturning the lower court's ruling 132 and in finding that
125 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting).
127 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting).
128 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). For the rationale behind the Teny stop, see supra
notes 7-21 and accompanying text.
129 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 1587.
132 United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit based
its decision on a poorly formulated and unsupported two-part test. See supra notes 62-
72, 85-91 and accompanying text. The two-part test clashed with precedent by requir-
ing the presence of ongoing criminal activity (category-one factors) and by stating that
"personal characteristics of drug couriers" (category-two factors) were relevant only "if
there was evidence of ongoing criminal behavior [category-one]," Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at
1585 (citing Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1420), and "the Government offered '[e]mpirical docu-
mentation' that the combination of facts at issue did not describe the behavior of'signifi-
cant numbers of innocent people.'" Id. (quoting Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1420). In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit seemingly ignored the Supreme Court's holdings in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but
which taken together warranted further investigation"), and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 441 (1980) ("there could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful con-
duct might justify the suspicion that criminal conduct was afoot").
There would also be practical problems associated with the Ninth Circuit's holding.
For instance, the ruling would greatly hamper the ability of agents to make the type of
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reasonable suspicion did exist, the Supreme Court's ruling presents
many problems to both citizens and courts.
The majority agreed that the validity of a brief investigative
stop requires " 'some minimal level of objective justification,' 133
taking into consideration " 'the totality of the circumstances-the
whole picture.' 134 While this holding rests more squarely with
precedent, the Court leaves many serious questions unanswered.
A. SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO SOKOLOW
Numerous factors present in Sokolow suggested Sokolow was in-
volved in suspicious activity.' 35 In retrospect, the DEA's decision to
stop Sokolow appeared proper because its suspicion was, in fact,
confirmed by the presence of cocaine in Sokolow's bag. The propri-
ety of the stop, however, does not depend on whether or not co-
caine was found, but rather whether the facts known to the agents at
the time of the seizure support a conclusion that reasonable suspi-
cion existed. 36
Nevertheless, the factors known to the agents at the time of the
seizure certainly justify a finding of "reasonable suspicion." The
facts go far beyond "some minimum level of objective justifica-
tion" 137 to the point where it would seem difficult even to hypothe-
size an innocent person traveling in the manner that Sokolow did.138
For example, it would be hard to understand why an innocent trav-
quick, on-the-spot determinations for which the Terry stop was originally developed and
require agents to consult statistical data whenever confronted with a "reasonable suspi-
cion" suspect. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Sokolow (No. 87-1295). In addition, agents
would not be permitted to stop a suspect unless there was an actual observation of
"ongoing criminal activity," no matter how suspicious a combination of category-two
factors was present. Id.
133 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
134 Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
135 See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
136 The fact that Sokolow was traveling under an alias is not a factor to be considered
in this particular case to justify the seizure because the DEA agents did not become
aware of the use of the alias until after the seizure had occurred. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at
1590 n.3.
137 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217.
138 Of course, it is not necessary to show that no innocent explanation is possible.
Such a level of proof would go beyond that needed even in a criminal trial to support
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.9,
326 (1979); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954). The Court also
addressed this standard in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) ("there could, of
course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot"). See also United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir.
1979) ("[lt must be rare indeed that an officer observes behavior consistent only with
guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation").
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eler would take a trip in May from Honolulu to Miami13 9 and stay
just forty-eight hours when the flight itself takes approximately
twenty hours.1 40 Furthermore, Sokolow paid $2100 for the tickets
out of a roll of twenty dollar bills containing approximately
$4000.141 In addition, while the DEA agents did not know at the
time of the stop that Sokolow was using an alias, they did have rea-
son to believe he was.' 42 Finally, Sokolow wore casual clothing, a
large amount of gold jewelry, had only carry-on luggage, 143 and "ac-
ted nervously and was looking around the waiting area."' 44 Since
the "reasonable suspicion" requisite is relatively low,' 45 it is obvi-
ously apparent that the stop of Sokolow was justified. Nevertheless,
instances in which a traveler was actually innocent, yet possessed the
above-mentioned characteristics, would be so rare that the limited
intrusion of an investigative stop on these innocent travelers would
be outweighed by the governmental1 46 and societal interests in-
volved in the reduction of narcotics trafficking.' 47
139 Sokolow's travel becomes particularly suspicious because Miami has been identi-
fied as a source city for cocaine. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1583.
140 This certainly doesn't make sense for a pleasure traveler because the similarities in
the climates and attractions of Miami and Honolulu hardly justify such a lengthy and
expensive trip for only two days.
141 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1583. Twenty-one hundred dollars is certainly a high price
to pay for a two-day vacation. The fact that Sokolow paid for it in cash also raises suspi-
cion because people rarely make $2100 purchases using cash, and rarely carry a roll of
twenty-dollar bills containing nearly twice that amount. Id. at 1586. Cash payment also
makes it doubtful that Sokolow was on a business trip because the majority of business
travelers pay their expenses by check or credit cards in order to seek reimbursement or
for business or tax records. Id. at 1586.
142 The Court thought there was reason to believe Sokolow was traveling under an
alias because the name he gave the airline ticket agent did not match the name listed
under the telephone number he gave. Id. at 1586 n.3.
143 Id. at 1583. Seemingly the use of carry-on luggage was Sokolow's effort to prevent
a baggage handler from accidentally opening his bag or to prevent the bag from coming
into the possession of a mistaken traveler.
144 Id. Presumably, this behavior is a typical reaction by someone acting in an illegal
manner who fears detection.
145 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a Teny stop could be justified even with
"proof of wrongdoing amounting to less than a preponderance of the evidence." See
supra note 83.
146 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1968) (discussion of the balancing of
governmental interests against the intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment
rights).
147 The importance of stopping narcotics traffickihg was articulated by Justice Powell
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980):
The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly
drugs for personal profit. Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our
population, particularly our young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of
controlled substances. Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted
by sophisticated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs
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B. PROBLEMS WITH MAJORITY'S HOLDING
While the Court was correct in determining that Sokolow pos-
sessed characteristics that were "reasonably suspicious," the Court's
holding provides little guidance for future courts in making "rea-
sonable suspicion" determinations. This problem results from the
Court's failure to draw a clear line as to the factors or combination
of factors necessary to support a finding of "reasonable suspicion."
While the facts in Sokolow were sufficient to justify an investigative
stop, 148 lower courts will be left guessing as to what level of conduct
would meet the "reasonable suspicion" standard.
A comparison of the Court's holding with precedent, likewise,
provides a confusing pattern. In Reid,149 the Court found a set of
factors which were "strikingly similar"150 to be insufficient to estab-
lish "reasonable suspicion."' 15 1 On the other hand, in Royer, 152 the
Court held that the factors present, though also similar,153 were suf-
ficient to justify an investigative stop to confirm or dispel suspicion
that Royer was a drug courier. 154
It would thus appear that the Supreme Court draws the "rea-
sonable suspicion" line somewhere between Royer and Reid. Much
of the confusion surrounding the exact location of this line is a re-
sult of the amorphous set of characteristics upon which DEA agents
often rely in making "reasonable suspicion" determinations, and
the way that these characteristics are seemingly adapted to meet any
particular situation. 155
... may be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal con-
duct may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.
Id. at 561-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
148 See supra notes 135-147 and accompanying text.
149 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
150 United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Reid, 448 U.S. at 438. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a list of the
factors present in Reid.
152 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
153 The factors known at the time Royer was seized included the following:
(1) Royer was carrying American Tourister Luggage, which appeared to be heavy,
(2) [Royer] was young, apparently between [the ages of] 25-35, (3) he was casually
dressed, (4) he appeared pale and nervous, looking around at other people, (5) he
paid for his ticket in cash with a large number of bills, and (6) rather than complet-
ing the airline identification tag to be attached to checked baggage, which had a
space for a name, address, and telephone number, Royer wrote only a name and the
destination.
Id. at 493 n.2.
154 Id. at 502. The Court, however, affirmed the reversal of Royer's conviction of
felony possession of marijuana based on the fact that "Royer was involuntarily detained
in a manner that exceeded the limited restraint permitted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)." Royer, 460 U.S. at 492.
155 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reliance on officers' training
and experience creates additional problems. For example, it is
highly possible that a court could affirm an officer's belief that "rea-
sonable suspicion" existed, even though such belief was not war-
ranted, by hiding behind a phrase such as "the evidence known to
an officer must be viewed, 'fact on fact and clue on clue,' in light of
the inferences and deductions that a trained and experienced officer
would reach, 'inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.' "156
This problem is compounded by the current uproar in the
United States concerning the detection of illicit drugs and the effec-
tive enforcement of narcotics laws.' 57 Under the prevalent mood in
today's society, it is highly conceivable that a court would affirm a
rather suspect "reasonable suspicion" determination by the seizing
officer if the questionable search did, in fact, turn up illicit drugs.
This result is unacceptable and represents a serious intrusion upon
a person's constitutional rights. Furthermore, a series of decisions
confirming this view would provide an incentive for officers to
search those persons whose conduct and characteristics could best
be described as falling below the level of "reasonable suspicion"
necessary to justify a stop. This problem is especially serious con-
sidering the unavailability of effective recourse which a victim of an
unjustified search possesses.' 5 8
The Supreme Court majority furthers the intrusive effects of its
decision by conveniently misreading the Court's earlier decision in
Royer.' 59 Sokolow contended "that the agents were obligated to use
the least intrusive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions
156 Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) (No.
87-1295) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1981)); see also Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980) (Powell,J. concurring); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(1979) (a trained and experienced officer can "perceive and articulate meaning in given
conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer"); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) ("[i]n all situations the officer is entitled to
assess the facts in light of his experience"); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("due weight must be
given... to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer) ... is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience").
157 See supra note 147.
158 In most cases involving unlawful seizures, the best result for such victims is merely
the exclusion of such evidence. A fruitless search by the agents, however, of an innocent
victim provides that victim with little recourse because the victim faces the difficult task
of proving damages as a result of the intrusion upon his or her rights. See, e.g., Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (plaintiffs required to prove actual damages to recover for
mental and emotional distress as a result of denial of their procedural rights without due
process).
159 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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that he was smuggling narcotics."' 160 Sokolow based his contention
on justice White's majority opinion in Royer.161 Justice White stated
that "the investigative methods employed should be the least intru-
sive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspi-
cion in a short period of time."' 162 The Sokolow majority narrowly
construed this statement as being "directed at the length of the in-
vestigative stop, not at whether the police had a less intrusive means
to verify their suspicions before stopping Royer." 163 In so holding,
the Court ignored the very next line in the Royer opinion, which
states, "It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it
seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investiga-
tive seizure."' 164 Thus, the Sokolow Court tries to limit the officer's
obligation to use the least intrusive investigative means reasonably
available to time only, while the Royer Court explicitly extended such
obligation to both scope and time.
In misreading the Royer decision, the Court attempted to do
more than necessary in this particular case. The Court still could
have reached the same result in Sokolow by faithfully following Royer.
It is important to remember that when Sokolow was stopped by
DEA agents he was about to enter a taxicab. 165 The majority
claimed that Sokolow's interpretation of Royer would "unduly ham-
per the police's ability to make swift on-the-spot decisions" 166 and it
would force reviewing courts to "indulge in 'unrealistic second-
guessing.' "167 The dissent, on the other hand, believed no seizure
was in order at the time and that the agents should have merely
engaged in "routine police investigation, which may ultimately gen-
erate sufficient information to blossom into probable cause."' 168
Furthermore, the dissent was confident that the agents possessed
enough information about Sokolow that "it is unreasonable to sug-
gest that, had Sokolow left the airport, he would have been gone
160 United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989) (citing Brief for Respon-
dent at 12-13, 21-23, Sokolow (No. 87-1295)).
161 Royer, 460 U.S. at 491.
162 Id. at 500.
163 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
164 Royer, 460 U.S. at 503 (emphasis added).
165 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1584.
166 Id. at 1587.
167 Id. (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985))).
168 Id. at 1588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Presumably the agents should have merely
questioned Sokolow in an effort to confirm or dispel their suspicions that he was en-
gaged at that time in narcotics smuggling.
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forever and thus immune from subsequent investigation."'' 69
Under the circumstances present in Sokolow, it is apparent that
both the majority and the dissent handled this issue incorrectly.
The dissent was incorrect in its suggestion that Sokolow should not
have been seized at the time. While under most circumstances it
would be less intrusive and probably preferable first to question a
suspect to "verify or dispel the officer's suspicion"'170 rather than to
seize him, this was not one of those situations because Sokolow was
about to enter a taxicab and depart from the airport, presumably
beyond the officer's immediate surveillance. 171 The dissent is also
incorrect in stating that the agents could have resumed their investi-
gation of Sokolow at a later time. 172 Drug smuggling is an art which
relies on quick movement and deceptive tactics. It is therefore
highly probable that once Sokolow left the airport he would have
disposed of his illicit possessions within a very short period of time.
Thus, if the agents resumed their investigation at a later date, it is
unlikely that they would have been able to catch Sokolow with the
illicit drugs still in his possession.
The majority, likewise, is incorrect in its use of the "hampering
police activity" proposition. 173 While it is true that, in retrospect,
there will almost always appear to be a less intrusive means available
for an officer to conduct a search, and therefore such a requirement
would both "unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift on-
the-spot decisions ' ' 74 and require courts to "indulge in 'unrealistic
second-guessing,' 175 this is not the applicable standard. Rather,
the proper standard, as articulated in Royer, is whether "the investi-
gative methods employed [were] ... the least intrusive means reason-
ably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion."' 176
Since Sokolow was about to enter a taxicab, 177 it appears that
the least intrusive means that the officers reasonably possessed at
that time, to verify or dispel their suspicions, was to actually seize
Sokolow. Thus, the agent's seizure of Sokolow could not be invali-
169 Id. at 1590 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Sokolow, after all, had given the airline his
phone number, and the DEA, having ascertained that it was indeed Sokolow's voice on
the answering machine at that number, could have learned from that information where
Sokolow resided." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 1587 (citing Brief for Respondent at 12-13, 21-23, Sokolow (No. 87-1295)).
171 Id. at 1587.
172 Id. at 1590 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
173 Id. at 1587; see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
174 Id. at 1587.
175 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985)).
176 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (emphasis added).
177 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
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dated on the grounds that the agents did not use the least intrusive
means reasonably available. Consequently, the Court could have
been faithful to the holding in Royer, while at the same time uphold-
ing the agent's search of Sokolow. Instead, the Court chose to mis-
read Royer, while at the same time severely intruding on future
citizens' fourth amendment rights.'7 8
C. THE USE OF DRUG COURIER PROFILES
An important issue in Sokolow is the significance which attaches
to a narcotics officer's use of a drug courier profile1 79 to identify
potential drug smugglers. The use of such a profile in the identifica-
tion of Sokolow became apparent from Agent Kempshall's testi-
mony, in which he stated that Sokolow's behavior "had all the classic
aspects of a drug courier."' 8 0
The Sokolow majority downplayed the significance of the use of
the drug courier profile by the seizing officer, stating "[W]e do not
agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the
agent's belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA's
'drug courier profiles.' "181 In contrast, the majority chose to con-
centrate strictly on the factors articulated by the officers-factors the
majority deemed to be sufficient.18 2
The dissent, on the other hand, correctly regarded the use of
drug courier profiles as highly significant and extremely im-
proper.8 3 Sokolow argued that the use of these profiles is danger-
ous because 1) the validity of the profile has never been
established, 8 4 2) "the profile itself has been proven to have no pre-
dictive value in the investigation of airport narcotics trafficking,"' 18 5
and 3) the characteristics of the profile are not themselves objec-
178 The incorrectness and the potential dangers of the Sokolow holding is exhibited by
the fact that a literal interpretation of such ruling would seemingly approve of any
search, no matter how intrusive, provided the search was carried out in a short period of
time.
179 "The 'drug courier profile' is an abstract of characteristics found to be typical of
persons transporting illegal drugs." Royer, 460 U.S. at 493 n.2.
180 Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587 n.6.
181 Id. at 1587 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 14-21, Sokolow (No. 87-1295)).
182 Id. "A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must re-
quire the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these
factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary
significance as seen by a trained agent." Id.
183 See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
184 Brief for Respondent at 19, Sokolow (No. 87-1295). The government has never
proven that the drug courier profile accurately identifies drug couriers. Cloud, Search
and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formu-
las, 65 B.U.L. REV. 843, 875-77 (1985).
185 Brief for Respondent at 20-2 1, Sokolow (No. 87-1295) (citing Cloud, supra note
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tively suspicious of criminal behavior.' 8 6
The fact that the characteristics set forth in the drug courier
profile are not objectively suspicious becomes apparent from the in-
stances where the profile has been inconsistently applied in the
past.18 7 For instance, deplaning first should not be held to be objec-
tively suspicious 88 if deplaning last or from the middle is also ob-
jectively suspicious.' 8 9 Likewise, traveling alone should not be held
to be objectively suspicious' 90 if traveling with a companion is also
held to be suspicious.' 9 ' Indeed, one agent has testified that "the
profile in a particular case consists of anything that arouses his
suspicions."1 92
Further compounding this problem is the notable difficulty in-
volved in the judicial review of a seizure where "reasonable suspi-
cion" was based on conformance with a drug courier profile.19 3 The
notion that "each case raising a Fourth Amendment issue must be
judged on its own facts"' 194 is central to the concept of judicial re-
view. "No 'litmus-paper' test 195 can determine whether or not the
police possessed sufficient facts to justify the seizure of an individ-
ual."' 196 The drug courier profile, as used, seems to be the epitome
of the "litmus-paper" test the Court had earlier rejected. It is po-
tentially even more damaging because a ruling court evaluates the
facts "based upon the fair inferences in light of the agent's experi-
ence." 197 Thus, the dangers of an ever changing drug-courier pro-
file, seemingly adapted to each situation, and validated based on an
officer's "experience," provides a "wild-card" to allow officers to
justifiably seize almost anyone. 198
184, at 886-920). Empirical data has shown that the profile used to identify drug couri-
ers lacks predictive value for that purpose. Id.
186 Brief for Respondent at 16-18, Sokolow (No. 87-1295).
187 For examples of instances in which the drug courier profile has been inconsistently
applied, see supra note 110.
188 Deplaning first has been held to be a factor which could be used in a "reasonable
suspicion" determination. See, e.g. United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 808 (6th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
189 See supra note 110.
190 Traveling alone has been held to be a factor which could be used in a "reasonable
suspicion" determination. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir.
1978).
191 See supra note 110.
192 United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
193 Brief for Respondent at 15-16, Sokolow (No. 87-1295).
194 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565 n.6 (1980) (PowellJ., concurring).
195 Cloud, supra note 184, at 857 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983)
(White, J., plurality opinion)).
196 Id. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
197 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
198 The Second Circuit warned of this problem in United States v. Buenaventura-
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"Independent judicial review is an illusion if a new drug courier
profile is produced to fit each seizure." 199 Furthermore, "to place
undue reliance upon the agent's perceptions and conclusions would
be to completely surrender the court's power and responsibility of
critically evaluating whether a seizure is justified by a suspicion that
is reasonable and a factual basis that is articulable." 200
While the drug courier profile might be a valuable tool for DEA
agents in fighting the war against drugs, its use is plagued with nu-
merous pitfalls. It is, therefore, apparent that the Sokolow dissent
correctly identified the significance of the use of drug courier
profiles. While the profile's ever-changing nature makes effective
judicial review impossible, a stagnant profile would likewise be with-
out value because drug couriers will easily adapt their behaviors to
avoid detection from a profile-focused officer. 201
VII. CONCLUSION
The Sokolow decision resulted from the Supreme Court's efforts
to correct a poorly formulated and unsupported two-part test 20 2
which emerged from the Ninth Circuit. In reversing the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Sokolow Court reached a decision which rested more
squarely with precedent and was harmonious with the circumstances
presented in the case. The Sokolow rationale, however, presents
many potentially harmful consequences.
In failing to clearly define the combination of factors necessary
to support a finding of "reasonable suspicion," the Sokolow Court
lends little guidance to other Courts faced with the task of reviewing
a Terry stop. Furthermore, this failure to set objective guidelines er-
odes the concept of judicial review by allowing Courts to affirm
questionable "reasonable suspicion" determinations by placing
blind reliance on an officer's training and experience. 20 3
The Sokolow Court furthered the intrusive nature of its opinion
by misreading its earlier holding in Royer.204 By misreading the
Royer decision, the Sokolow Court seemingly permits any type of
seizure, no matter how intrusive, provided it is carried out in a
Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980): "The fact that an officer is experienced does not
require a court to accept all of his suspicions as reasonable, nor does mere experience
mean that the agent's perceptions are justified by the objective facts." Id. at 36.
199 Cloud, supra note 184, at 858.
200 Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d at 37.
201 United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 n.1 (1989).
202 See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
204 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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timely manner. This ruling is contrary to Royer, which expressly
stated that the "seizure must be sufficiently limited in both scope
and duration." 20 5
Finally, the Court refused to recognize the significance and po-
tential dangers associated with the use of drug courier profiles as a
basis for determining "reasonable suspicion." In contrast, the dis-
sent correctly addressed the hazards of relying on a profile that has
never been established to be valid,206 has been proven to have no
predictive value,20 7 and consists of factors which are not objectively
suspicious. 208
Overall, the Sokolow decision appears correct as applied to the
particular facts presented to the Court. While such a ruling was
proper as applied to Sokolow and will seemingly provide a much
needed boost to law enforcement agents in the nation's war on nar-
cotics, the intrusive effects of the Sokolow ruling on all citizens'
fourth amendment rights is far too great to justify the Court's
rationale.
STEVEN K. BERNSTEIN
205 Royer, 460 U.S. at 503.
206 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
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